When the then candidate Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffu Addo of the New Patriotic Party(NPP) made a campaign promise in 2016 to create new regions across the country, there was an immediate political outcry suggesting that his motive was to canvass political capital to enhance future political fortunes of the NPP. Yet, whether the initial criticisms from political opponents about the so-called political capital to be gained from the creation of the regions were right or wrong, the subsequent wave of euphoria that greeted the process of getting regional autonomy by the residents of the newly created regions was demonstrably strong and signaled a huge potential electoral benefit for the NPP.
However, recent developments have shown clearly that the kind of “politics” that characterises the regional creation have suggested that the mere creation of these regions is not a guarantee that this would enhance the electoral fortunes of the NPP. How this policy decision could be subsequently translated into electoral fortunes for the NPP is dependent, to a large extent, on the successful implementation of the last phase of the regional creation process; the consultative approach proposed by the sector minister in selecting the regional capitals. A proper and principled, but transparent procedure that engages competent experts of technocrats for the final selection of the regional capitals would determine the electoral benefits to be gained by the NPP.I am convinced that the deployment of compromised procedures, bereft of technocratic scrutiny and advice, to the selection of the regional capitals would not only amount to policy implementation failure in theoretical terms but could also practically derail government set developmental objectives for the new regions. This would only retrogress progress rather than enhance development.
Regrettably, the recent consultative approach proposed by the minister, which seeks to rely on the consensus of chiefs for the selection of the regional capitals, is not only detrimental, but politically dangerous and suicidal. I was initially excited to learn that due diligence would be conducted when the minister initially announced that the government was not heeding to any lobbyists, but would rather consult technocrats for expert advice regarding the selection of the regional capitals. A few days later, I was disappointed when the minister abandoned his initial stance and proposed a new selection procedure, thus setting in motion some kind of inconsistency and “policy indiscipline”. Rather than using technocrats, the minister announced that government would rely on consensus of chiefs for the selection of the regional capitals. According to the minster, chiefs in the respective regions were to discuss among themselves and build consensus on which of the towns would be preferred for the siting of the regional capitals. Thereafter, the proposed capitals would be presented to the appropriate authorities for approval. The announcement of this new selection criteria got me worried and subsequently provoked this intervention; i.e. drawing government attention through this article., In this article, I advance some key arguments to suggest that the new selection criteria announced by the government is not only a wrong policy path, but it is also politically dangerous and suicidal for the ruling party’s electoral fortunes.
First, it is well known that the hierarchical structures of most of our chieftaincy institutions do not give platform for a negotiated consensus on issues involving the paramount chiefs and their sub-chiefs, especially when a paramount chief has a personal interest, right? So, when the minister proclaimed that chiefs in the respective new regions were to discuss among themselves and build consensus on the chosen towns to be presented for approval as regional capitals, what sort of consensus was he referring to? Authoritarian consensus or negotiated consensus? It is obvious that almost all the paramount chiefs in the newly created regions have their preferences about where they want the regional capitals to be sited. Nevertheless, their preferences might not necessarily serve as the best options. Nor would they reflect the commonweal of the people. But because of the dominant hierarchical structure of the chieftaincy institution, where the overlords or the paramount chiefs wield supreme power over the other sub-chiefs, it is very unlikely (or even abominable) that any sub-chief would suggest a dissent opinion. Consequently, a decision that will be presented to the minister is most likely to be an imposed decision rather than consensual one. In this way, the government is not only jeopardizing the future of the regions but also digging its own grave in terms of political capital. Majority of the populace will harbour grievances against the government, especially when the imposed decision does not reflect the will of the majority, and they have all the reasons to believe that the procedure has been compromised under the guise of consensus.
Second, even any neophyte political risk analyst interested in Ghanaian politics should have known by now that the significance of our chiefs in voter mobilization has drastically reduced across most of the regions in Ghana. In fact, there is ample and incontrovertible evidence from recent research and electoral outcomes that show that chiefs are virtually becoming insignificant in influencing voter behavior in our body politics. The Ghanaian voter is not that conservative, and is not stuck in the 1990s politics. They have advanced to a point where the political linage or endorsement of chiefs does not make any meaningful impact on them. This is partly so because they might have realised that the 1992 constitution politely sidelines chiefs in our body politics. This does not suggest that people do not pay allegiance to their chiefs. They still do in other ways, but not politically. People might display their ethnic loyalty to their chiefs, but when it comes to policy issues, the Ghanaian voter has over the years demonstrated a voting behavior independent of the influence of chiefs. The Ghanaian voter has matured to the extent that he knows and understands the power of the ballot box. Hence, it is much more politically prudent to adopt transparent approaches that reflect the will of the people rather than the whims and caprices of a few chiefs who might mislead in wrong decision-taking and create disaffection for the government, with the result that this might woefully dwindle electoral fortunes.
Lastly, it is also proper to avoid a possible friction between traditional authorities and local government administrative structures. The preferred choices of most of the paramount chiefs are traditional capital towns where the paramount chiefs are located. A possible contentious conflict situation is likely to occur if we entertain the preferred choices of the chiefs regarding the siting of the regional capitals, especially if these are the locations the chiefs live. Siting the regional capitals in traditional capital cities might lead to unnecessary meddling in the affairs of state authorities which might lead to lack of autonomy in local government administration. This could be a potential trigger of contentious conflict situations between the traditional rulers and local government officials. The consequences for such needless interference and conflicts are obvious.
I am not however suggesting that chiefs should be eliminated from the selection process entirely. I think their involvement is still necessary, but they should not be left entirely to decide on the location of the regional capitals as the minister has proposed. For instance, as key stakeholders in the selection process, the chiefs could be involved by way of creating a platform to let them understand the policy approaches behind the reasons for proper selection of regional capitals and why certain places would be more suitable than others. This level of engagement will placate aggrieved chiefs and helps to prevent future potential confusion between different communities.
To this end, while the creation of the new regions seems to have created an opportunity for electoral benefits to be mined, the consultative approach which seeks to rely on the consensus of chiefs for the regional capitals will most likely thwart this political fortune of the ruling party. It is only wise that the government and the sector ministers engage meditatively with these thoughts. I have no doubt that these reflections (and perhaps other well intended ones shared by civil society groups) will contribute meaningfully to the achievement of government set objectives for the new regions.
The author, Ghadafi Saibu is a PhD candidate of African Politics and Development Policy, University of Bayreuth, Germany. He can be reached through: sghadafi@daad-alumni.de
